Interbank Netting Agreements and the Distribution ofBank Default Risk
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) provided support for netting contracts among banks and other regulated financial institutions in order to lessen systemic risk (Parkinson 1993, p. 63; Wall 1993, p. 5) . Important types of interbank netting agreements include bilateral payments netting, multilateral payment systems with net settlement, and master derivative agreements. Proponents of these netting agreements point out that netting generally reduces the interbank credit exposures faced by individual banks. Thus, a liquidity or solvency problem at one bank is less likely to create a "domino effect" in the interbank market since the transmission channels for such a shock have been reduced in absolute magnitude. In the case of multilateral netting, the average reduction in credit-risk exposures faced by banks after netting may be of an order of magnitude or more.
The proposition that interbank netting reduces systemic risk has an important corollary that is often left unstated. The corollary is that, as a result of interbank netting agreements, bank default risk is redistributed to those participating banks' creditors whose claims are not included in the netting agreement. These excluded creditors may consist of uninsured depositors and other nonbank liability holders, respondent banks, holders of various types of bank equity securities, the central bank, and, of course, the deposit insurer and ultimately the taxpayer. If any of these creditor classes are unsuited for risk-bearing or are not properly compensated for the increased risks they bear, then the risk-shifting aspect of interbank netting schemes presents a negative offset to the benefits associated with them.
This paper provides a model of an interbank payments market and then characterizes the redistribution of bank default risk that arises from interbank netting agreements. The paper identifies the efficiency trade-offs that accompany netting agreements, making explicit the substitution of concentrated bank default-risk exposure for reduced interbank, or systemic, risk exposure. To highlight the redistributive aspects of interbank netting agreements, I posit a very simple liability structure for banks, consisting only of insured non-bank deposits, uninsured interbank claims, and equity. It becomes clear in this framework that the direct economic losses that cause a bank to fail (e.g., loan losses) cannot be eliminated by interbank agreements, although they may be redistributed. Thus, the case for interbank netting agreements can be recast as a statement about the relative efficiency of various risk-sharing arrangements in the banking system. This applies equally to payments and over-the-counter financial markets that utilize interbank netting agreements.
The main result of the paper implies that interbank netting agreements are beneficial only if the holders of non-netted claims on a failing bank--in this model, the deposit insurer--can more efficiently bear the losses caused by the bank's failure by themselves than could the bank's creditors as a whole. Stated in this way, it is clear that commonly expressed arguments in favor of interbank netting agreements are at their core also statements about the relative risk-bearing capabilities of various agents and institutions. It is quite possible that concentrated risk-bearing is beneficial on balance, since this provides incentives for effective delegated monitoring.
However, it bears pointing out that the endorsement of interbank netting agreements, such as that contained in FDICIA, implies the acceptance of an heightened degree of responsibility on the part of the deposit insurer and other non-bank creditors for the risks incurred in, and more broadly, the stability of, the banking system.
The first section of the paper describes a simple model of interbank payments without netting agreements, a central bank, or deposit insurance. Section II adds a deposit insurer and shows that "delegated monitoring" by this institution on behalf of depositors generates important efficiency gains. Section III illustrates both bilateral and multilateral interbank netting agreements in an economy with deposit insurance, pointing out how these arrangements alter the ex ante distribution of bank default risk. Section IV illustrates the main result of the paper with a smallscale example. The role of a central bank in the interbank payment system is discussed briefly. The paper's final section concludes.
I. A Model of Interbank Payments
This section describes a model of interbank payments without deposit insurance, netting agreements, or a central bank. Subsequent sections address these arangements, in turn.
Agents. The model economy lasts for two periods and consists of a large number of risk-neutral agents who are identical at T=O, the beginning of the first period. The economy's agents are initially uniformly geographically dispersed among N neighborhoods, each of which contains M members. Hence, there are MN agents in all. Each agent begins with one unit of a consumption good and seeks to maximize his or her consumption of the good at the end of period two, T=2.
The rate of time discounting of consumption is zero.
Each agent receives an idiosyncratic "geographic-preference shock" at the beginnning of period one (which lasts from T=O and T= 1) indicating the neighborhood to which the agent must move in order to derive utility from consumption at T=2.' Ex ante, each agent is equally likely to prefer any one of the economy's other N-i neighborhoods over his or her original location. The number of agents who wish to move from any given neighborhood ito another neighborhood j in the economy is given by x~E~O,M],i,j=1 N, where x~= 0, and = M for each i. A complete description of the movements of agents originating in any neighborhood i is given by {x 11 ,x 12 , . . ., XiN }, while a summary of the agents arriving in neighborhood i is given bỹ
Let the expected number of agents that wish to move from neighborhood ito any other neighborhood j, E[xJ, be denoted X, which clearly lies between zero and M. This quantity is the gross expected movement of agents from one location to another. We will also have occasion to discuss the net expected movements of agents within the economy under two different netting assumptions. I will let X denote the net expected movement of agents between any given neighborhood i and another neighborhood j, while X will denote the net expected movement of agents between any given neighborhood i and all other neighborhoods. These two quantities, defined as E{~x-x 11 ] and E [~(x~-x 1~] ,respectively, are both positive, even though E[x~-x 11 ] = 0 and (x~-x 1~) ] =0. In words, the expected net movement of agents between neighborhoods i and j in one direction or the other, as well as the expected net movement between any given neighborhood i and all other neighborhoods considered as a whole, are both greater than zero. This is true even though no neighborhood experiences a net increase or decrease in its population in expectation. The important implication of these facts is that non-zero amounts of interbank settlement can be expected to occur even in a symmetric economy such as the one envisioned here. Note that 0 < X < X <X < M, and that, if we let {XN} represent a sequence of expectations as N becomes large, then lirn XN = 0, as an application of the law of large numbers. Consistent with my assumption that banks are local monopolists, I assume that agents who deposit their consumption good at T=0 receive only their reservation utility in expectation. With banks operating under a regime of no deposit insurance, each agent holding the deposit receipt of a failed bank must seek to recover his or her endowment; this expected liquidation cost isfL per agent. The agents' voluntary-participation constraint thus requires a bank deposit contract net of expected liquidation costs, R-JL, to provide in expectation at least the value of his or her endowment less the cost of moving it to another neighborhood, 1-S. Therefore, participation of all agents will be assured by banks promising R+JL=l-S+JL when no deposit insurance exists.
With deposit insurance, depositors demand only R=l-S.
Gross settlement of interbank payments occurs as follows. At T=0, any given bank i's balance sheet consists only of the risky loan, deposits, and owner's equity (a residual of loan value over deposit promises, since the banker contributes no equity of his own):
Net worth
The risky loan will pay off in period two, so its value at T=O--and therefore, the bank's net worth--is a random variable. The bank's initial deposit obligations are to the M depositors who originate in neighborhood i and who will move to the other N-1 neighborhoods in the economy.
Bank i's depositors will take their deposit receipts with them and trade them for deposits in their new location.
Geographic-preference shocks are realized and acted upon in period one. Upon arrival in neighborhoodj at T=i, the holder of a deposit receipt from bank i trades the bank i deposit for a bank j deposit, which promises an amount R+JL of the consumption good in neighborhood j at T=2. Each bank's original deposit obligations can now be specified as due-to balances that will be collected by the other banks in the economy at T=2 (in amount~x(R + JL)). 
II. Deposit Insurance
In this and subsequent sections, I ask the following question: How would a given set of payment-system arrangements including deposit insurance and interbank netting agreements differ from the gross-settlement system described above in the presence of a single bank failure?
In particular, how would the losses be shared and what are the deadweight costs incurred?
I model a deposit insurer as a profit-maximizing institution that is constrained (perhaps by law)
to break even in expectation. The fair deposit-insurance premium per unit of deposits,p, is derived from the deposit insurer's break-even condition, NP(l-S) -L = 0, where P represents the average deposit-insurance premium per bank, or
. This obligation appears on the balance sheet of all banks as of T= 1 after all agents have reached their new locations, but is not payable until T=2, when all other payment obligations are settled. The purpose of a deposit insurer here is solely to serve as the delegated monitor (in Diamond's (1984) sense) of all banks on behalf of depositors. Since any bank that approaches insolvency is closed immediately when its net worth, net of all costs, reaches zero, the deposit insurer never absorbs any losses. Deposit insurance is welfare-enhancing even though there is no insurance reserve. 6 Each bank's interim (T=1) balance sheet differs from the previous case because the deposit interest rate is now simply R=1-S, which benefit is offset to some extentby the obligation to pay a deposit-insurance premium, P: 
III. Interbank Netting Agreements
The reason interbank netting agreements may lower systemic risk is that they tend to reduce direct credit exposures between banks. This procedure is expedient from the standpoint of banks (including the central bank) that wish to avoid the inter-bank transmission of economic losses.
However, subjecting a subset of a bank's liabilities to a netting agreement also alters the previously existing risk-sharing arrangements among the bank's creditors. In essence, netting Notice that due-from and due-to balances are strictly smaller than was the case under gross settlement. The important implication of this fact is that bank i's total liabilities have been reduced, while the amount of insured deposits--~x~R --has not changed. Thus, the proportion of total liabilities represented by insured deposits has increased.
It is now possible to state one version of the paper's main result, namely, that the existence of an interbank netting agreement shifts bank default risk toward bank creditors whose claims are not included in the netting agreement.
Result 1. The deposit insurer bears a larger proportion of any economic loss arising from a bank failure under a bilateral interbank netting agreement than under a gross settlement regime.
Proof. Compare the expected T=2 liability structure (viewed at T=0) of bank i both with and without the bilateral netting agreement. This liability structure implies the sharing rule that would apply among the failed bank's various liability holders if a marginal economic loss of e were to occur (that is, if Zwere allowed to go belowZF by the amount e).
Bank i's expected liabilities under gross settlement are E[~x~R]+(1 + P)E[~xi 1 R] = (2 + p~N-1)XR
but the contingent liability of the deposit insurer includes only bank i's deposits, or (N-l)XR, out of a total of 2(N-l)XR owed by bank ito the other banks and agents in the economy (i.e., excluding the deposit insurer). Hence, the proportion of incremental bank default risk borne by the deposit insurer is exactly one half under a gross-settlement regime. Proof. Compare the expected T=2 liability structure (viewed at T=0) of bank i with a multilateral netting agreement, with a bilateral netting agreement, and with no interbank netting agreement.
Once again, note that the liability structure implies the sharing rule that would apply among the failed bank's various liability holders if a marginal economic loss of e were to occur (that is, if Z, were allowed to go below ZF by the amount c). Bank i's expected liabilities (excluding the deposit-insurance premium) under gross settlement and under bilateral netting were shown in the multilateral netting with a net due-to balance are:
The proportion of bank default risk borne by the deposit insurer is
since (N / 2(N -i))X <X < X for N>2 and therefore (N / 2(N -i))X < X, which proves that the deposit insurer bears a larger proportion of any incremental economic loss arising from a bank failure under a multilateral interbank netting agreement than under a gross settlement regime.
The second part of the assertion holds if
x+(N/2(N-1)ix> x+(N/2(N-1))x
but this follows directly from the fact that X < X. Q.E.D.
Note that, in the limit--that is, as the number of independent banks included in a multilateral netting agreement increases without bound--the proportion of bank default risk borne by the deposit insurer approaches one. This is because the sum of net interbank balances approaches zero. 8 In practice, a large multilateral netting agreement may approach this limit with as few as a hundred members. CHIPS (the Clearing House Interbank Payment System), for example, reportedly achieves netting ratios in the neighborhood of 95% in its daily clearings.
IV. Illustration of Interbank Netting Agreements in the Foreign-Exchange Market
In this section, I illustrate the risk shifting that occurs in the presence of interbank netting agreements with an example set in the context of the foreign-exchange market. I then briefly discuss the role of a central bank in the presence of interbank netting agreements.
Interbank Netting Agreements and the Distribution ofBank Default Risk in the Foreign-
Exchange Market: An Example. Consider three banks, headquartered in the U.S., Canada, and the U.K., respectively. Suppose that, in the course of one day, the U.S. bank (Bank 1) agrees to purchase Canadian dollars from the Canadian bank (Bank 2) and agrees to sell a like amount of Canadian dollars to the U.K. bank (Bank 3). Meanwhile, Bank 2 agrees to purchase British pounds from Bank 3 in return for U.S. dollars. The specific delivery obligations that arise are the following (where "USD" means U.S. dollars, "CD" means Canadian dollars, and "BP" means British pounds):
• Bank 1 owes Bank 2 USD 30 million;
• Bank I owes Bank 3 CD 40 million;
• Bank 2 owes Bank 1 CD 40 million;
• Bank 2 owes Bank 3 USD 30 million;
• Bank 3 owes Bank 1 USD 30 million;
• Bank 3 owes Bank 2 BP 20 million. Now suppose Bank l's net worth is determined by its regulator to have fallen to a critical point that is just sufficient to cover the costs of resolving the bank; in other words, Z 1 has fallen to Zã nd NW 1 is written down to zero. If the regulator subsequently discovers that the true loss on Bank l's assets turns out be some positive amount, say $10 million, how will this loss be shared among the bank's depositors, creditors, and the deposit insurer?
In Netting across all currencies simultaneously in a series of bilateral agreements (i.e., converting all obligations to a common-currency basis for netting, as in FXNET, a limited partnership operated by 12 major banks in London (BIS 1993, p. 497) ) in fact reduces the net due-from and due-to balances for all three banks to zero in this example. This is because each of the foreignexchange transactions in this illustration is the same size--each contains one leg that equals USD 30 million. If all three banks agree to convert their interbank obligations to a common currency for purposes of bilateral netting, then all three banks are able to reduce their interbank exposures to zero without any settlement taking place. As a consequence, the FDIC' s exposure to losses arising from Bank l's assets becomes D 1 /( D 1 +0L 1 ), which is larger still than the exposure under a multilateral netting agreement covering only U.S. dollar obligations. Obviously, the same result could be achieved more generally in a multilateral interbank netting agreement that converted all interbank obligations to a common currency for the purposes of multilateral clearing (as is done by MULTINET, a grouping of 11 North American banks, or ECHO, a clearinghouse being developed by several banks in London (BIS 1993, pp. 497-8) ).
This illustration clearly demonstrates that interbank netting agreements reduce interbank credit exposures and, at the same time, shift bank default risk to bank creditors whose claims are not included in the netting agreements. For interbank netting agreements to live up to their potential as contributors to greater banking-sector stability, it must be the case that the risks they shift are adequately recognized and controlled by the parties accepting them, or at least, that the distortions in risk-bearing and -pricing they create are less costly in a welfare sense than are the systemic risks they replace. 
Endnotes
This device is meant to capture the notion that economic agents often need to transfer all or part of their wealth to another location or party. I define the payment system as that set of arrangements that facilitates the transfer of one's endowment.
2 In a stylized model such as this, one could imagine a 'leaky bucket' being used to carry the good (Calomiris and Kahn (1991) ). In the context of a modern payment system, S represents all the real-resource costs associated with paying in cash or otherwise making final settlement.
Note that the value of due-from claims is less than the value of the additional deposit obligations created.
Clearly, every bank has the incentive to defect from the payment system by refusing to accept arriving depositors' claims at par. Recall that I simply assume that this violation of banks' interim voluntary participation constraint is overridden by unspecified enforcement mechanisms, such as regulation.
'~This assumption may also be an accurate description of the post-FDICIA environment. Wall (1993) contends that, "In combination, these factors [FDICIA 's provisions] should almost eliminate the risk that one bank's failure would cause insolvency atother banks (p. 5)."
Although this assumption may not be realistic, it does, in fact, capture the intent of recent U.S. legislation:
"FDICIA has mandated that regulators virtually eliminate deposit insurance losses (Wall, p. 11) ."
Clearly, if the deposit insurer is not perfectly able to close a bank when it becomes insolvent, some losses may occur. A pre-funded insurance reserve to pay offinsured depositors would be desirable in this case if the deposit insurer's access to liquidity is limited or costly.
See Cohen and Roberds (1993, p. 6 ) for a discussion of required settlement flows under gross, bilateral net, and multilateral net settlement regimes.
8 In other words, the "netting ratio" approaches 100%, where this ratio is defined as the portion of gross settlement obligations that are satisfied by offsetting claims in the clearing procedure (and hence, do not result in any of the settlement medium being transferred).
Bilateral agreements that net interbank obligations across all three of the currencies simultaneously would make an important difference, however, as discussed below.
